Alive For Go-Ahead Men : A Delhi Press Magazine

Finally, the verdict is out. The report of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, tabled in the Indian Parliament on 16 December 2009, should make the people of India stand up and take notice of the cavalier manner in which the neta-babu combine, straddling the Ministry of Defence (MOD), are dealing with the country’s security.

If this slide is not arrested, it may not be long before we see a repeat of the ignomous defeat that we suffered at the hands of the Chinese Army, in 1962.

Kudos to this body of Indian legislatures who, cutting across party lines, have taken serious note of this lackadaisical attitude of the people in power, concerning India’s security. The report points out that the 3 wings of the Indian Armed Forces are working on the “Long Term Perspective Plan 2012 2027,” taking the “11th 5-Year Defence Plan 2007-2012” as their base. However, it is shocking that the Indian political masters and bureaucrats, holding the high chairs in MOD, have not approved this 5-year plan, even 3 years after it should have been implemented.

In other words, in the absence of an approved 5-year plan, the 3 wings of the Armed Forces are only shadowboxing, when they prepare for the 2012 - 2027 Long Term Perspective Plan. It is a fact that, even after 62 years of Independence, our political masters have not yet spelt out the country’s long-term strategic goals.

If we do not know what role we, as a country, want to play in the international arena in the short-term span of the next 8 to 10 years and longterm period of, say, 2 decades, what meaningful planning can be done by the security establishment? All that we have been doing till now, in the name of Defence planning, are the knee-jerk actions based on the imme- diate, developing situations. Instead of being proactive, we have always been reactive.

Very recently, Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor has confirmed that Pakistan has built 69 new bunkers on our western borders. The Chinese Army has been transgressing our eastern boundary in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, almost every other day, as if they are visiting picnic-spots.

Lacking coordination

Since the last 3 years, these border violations are averaging 208 per year.

Both these countries have now openly joined hands against India. These should have been sufficient enough reasons for the MOD in India to wake up and take immediate corrective measures. Have they?

Based on Kargil Committee recommendations, the Indian Government in 2003 had approved the plan of setting up a federal Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the MOD. Its job was to oversee the functioning of the intelligence agencies of the 3 Services and coordinate between the other Central and State intelligence agencies. More than 6 years later, no effort has been made to make this operational.

Another decision, aimed at better functioning of the MOD and timely decision-making, was that the 3 Service headquarters will be fully integrated with the MOD. The Armed Forces officers were also to be posted on Joint Secretary and Additional Secretary posts, which currently remain the exclusive domain of the bureaucrats. This proposal is also gathering dust.

What is most shocking is that, in 2003, based on the recommendations of the GOM, the then NDA Government had decided to implement the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) System in India also. This system is being followed in America, Britain, France and 67 other countries. The only rider was that, before implementation, a political consensus will be obtained.

The CDS system is required to coordinate the functioning of the 3 Services, which tend to pull in different directions, and create a synergy in them. What is most important is a common doctrinal platform.

Conflicting interests

Case in point is that, currently, the Army is harping on the concept of Cold Start in an event of limited war with Pakistan. The concept envisages no large mobilisation of forces, thereby losing the element of surprise — as it happened in Operation Parakram in 2002.

In this concept, the pre-designated, mobile battle groups start from their cantonments straight for war.

For this, they want the Indian Air Force (IAF) to provide them with close air support.

The IAF is telling the Army that they should use their own means, like helicopter gunships, and not burden it initially, with this role, as they want to degrade the overall capability of the enemy air force.

Both schools of thoughts have merit but who decides which one to adopt? This is where the CDS comes in.

Another most important function of the CDS system is that it provides a single-window military advice opportunity to the Government. CDS also resolves the procurement and planning requirement of the 3 Services, thereby ensuring optimal usage of the Defence Budget.

The Parliamentary Committee has taken note that 8 years have gone by and, in the name of obtaining political consensus for implementing the CDS system, all that the MOD has done is to write some letters to the States. Truth of the matter is that the bureaucrats, currently straddling the MOD and playing General, will lose their primacy. So, they do not want this CDS system.

The 3 Services Chiefs’ individual powers will also be eroded so they, too, not want this system. Politicians are also quite happy because the 3 Services keep on fighting their turf battles.

When things go wrong, these gentlemen can then blame one or all the 3 Services and they will come out clean.

The 1962 Indo-Chinese war debacle is a case in point.

For long, we, the people of India, have been listening to the parroted assurances by the Indian politicians and the 3 Service Chiefs that we are fully ready to give a befitting reply to anybody, who casts unholy eyes on India. Truth is just the opposite.

As of date, we suffer from a crippling shortage 11,387 officers in the Army, 1,512 officers in the Navy and 1,400 officers in the Air Force. These shortages are in the young and middle officers order, who form the cutting- edge of the Defence Services.

A recent study has brought out that, for the Army alone to make up for this deficiency, it will take 27 years,if no additional efforts are made. The situation in the Air Force and Navy is no better. Still, the powers- that-be seem quite unconcerned.

The IAF, which has a sanctioned strength of 39-and-a-half squadrons, is down to just 32 squadrons because we do not have any war-planes to fly.

The Indian Navy, which as per the Government’s own directive, was never to go less than 142 ships, is reduced to 132 warships now.

The 19 submarines, that we are currently having, are of very old vintage.

There is no guarantee that, if they dive in war conditions, they will ever resurface.